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U.S. History and Beyond
Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann
Nearly all readers who have persisted to this point in our roundtable discussion understand the depth of commitment required to write serious book-length 
history and recognize that most of us are nonetheless likely 
to reach very small audiences. Such disjuncture between 
effort and result suggests something about historians—
doggedness, perhaps, or other less positive qualities that 
many of those with whom we live might offer up in an 
honest moment (mulishness, obsessiveness, irrelevance). 
Indeed, we seem to be almost the last scholarly discipline 
that writes mostly books. But this disjuncture also helps 
explain the scale of my gratitude for receiving such careful 
readings and critiques of my book from four serious 
scholars whose work I admire. I thank them each for their 
time, their generosity, and their insights.
The reviewers use phrases such as “does an 
extraordinary service” (Christopher Jespersen), “does offer 
a broad, and quite satisfying, interpretive framework” 
(Rebecca de Schweinitz), “has made a significant 
contribution” using “an enormous number of sources” 
(Scott Kaufman), and offers “an ambitious project . . . that 
he substantially achieves” (Daniel Sargent). I am tempted 
to fold my cards, collect my earnings, tip my hat, and head 
for home.  No such luck, reader: the reviewers, as expected, 
also offer criticisms and suggestions, and these deserve to 
be engaged. So let me sharpen up my knives and see if I 
can carve into this particular feast of history and ideas in a 
useful manner.
Writing a book encompassing both the history of the 
United States and the history of the world across a decade 
practically guarantees that attentive readers will find 
information missing or interpretations shaded in ways they 
dislike. The canvas is simply too large for unanimity. Editor 
Andy Johns deserves credit for assembling a roundtable 
of historians with such a diversity of research interests. 
Christopher Jespersen and Rebecca de Schweinitz seem 
primarily concerned about issues on the domestic side of 
the story, while Scott Kaufman and Daniel Sargent lean 
more to issues on the international and global side. It is 
tempting to invoke the old adage that if one is making 
people unhappy on every side of an issue, one must be 
doing something right. This is not quite the case here, 
but the range and diversity of the reviewers’ concerns do 
highlight some of the challenges of trying to write history 
on this scale.
Jespersen likes “the scope and ambition of the project” 
but wants more analysis of the Tenerife air disaster in the 
Azores, more discussion of professional basketball, and 
more emphasis on Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon. 
De Schweinitz wishes for more childhood history and 
more social history of race reformers. Kaufman hopes for 
more popular culture, including American television, and 
more British history, including more Monty Python, but 
less “Americentrism.” Sargent contemplates more Russian 
and Indian history. The difficulty of writing this kind of 
history persuasively for all readers should be  crystal clear 
by now. One is tempted, almost, to dive back into one’s own 
small scholarly foxhole and settle back down into the safer 
confines of knowing too much about too little. Instead, I am 
taking careful notes for any future editions of The 1970s.
But I cannot resist a few brief annotations. First, Tenerife. 
I mention the accident in one sentence in a long paragraph 
of diverse examples of globalization’s unfinished business. 
I might have used other examples of limits of the spread 
of English as a global language, I suppose (perhaps the 
sign in the Paris hotel elevator reading “Please leave your 
values at the front desk”), rather than relying on David 
Crystal’s Cambridge University Press book for this point. 
Still, Tenerife hardly seems to qualify as a central target of 
critique, particularly since clarity and standardization of 
English language use were indeed one of the recommended 
measures for air traffic controllers worldwide that resulted 
specifically from the accident. 
Second, professional basketball. It pains me to note 
that it just was not that popular yet in the 1970s, nor that 
important as an industry. For what it’s worth, I grew up 
practically in the shadow of Duke University’s Cameron 
Indoor Stadium, nearly obsessed with playing, watching, 
and analyzing basketball. I went to ABA games in Raleigh’s 
Dorton Arena with my father and talked courtside, starry-
eyed, with his former student, all-star guard Bob Verga. 
Anyone who knew me in that decade could attest that 
the relative lack of emphasis on basketball in The 1970s 
demonstrates serious restraint in the face of temptation. I 
will, however, be among the first to order a good book on 
1970s basketball when it comes out.  
Third, Ford’s pardon of Nixon: clearly important but 
unwittingly omitted—point taken for the next edition.1 
Fourth, previous literature? I admire Bruce Schulman’s 
work on this decade, but I am no fan of David Frum’s 
intemperate and tendentious book. As for the social 
history of race reformers, my graduate school mentors—
all distinguished social historians of movements for racial 
justice—would surely be cringing at the idea that I did not 
provide enough on that topic, though my students would 
not likely wish for a still-longer book to read. Those same 
students, however, surely would have enjoyed still more 
American television content, although All In The Family, I 
must note, does actually make two appearances (115, 145). 
More Monty Python: who could disagree? The next edition 
will provide. But Americentrism, Russia, and India . . . now, 
I believe, we are getting to the central challenge.
In simplest form, the goal of The 1970s was to explain 
the development of American political culture during that 
decade, particularly as expressed in popular ideas and 
public policies, and place that development within a larger 
global context. The values and ideas that shaped American 
politics and culture were changing in crucial ways in this 
decade, and similar changes were visible far beyond U.S. 
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borders. To say that the book “suffers from Americentrism” 
(Kaufman), then, is really to say that it does what it set out 
to do. Guilty as charged. But Daniel Sargent will not let 
me off so easily, and anyone reading his review will have 
no trouble seeing why the Berkeley History Department 
swept him up swiftly a few years back. He notes that “The 
1970s bills itself as a ‘new global history,’ but the book in 
fact operates at multiple levels” and that “American history 
is the unambiguous priority among the national histories 
that The 1970s engages.” 
Here I must plead failure: failure to win a vigorous 
debate with Princeton University Press, which insisted on 
the use of “global history” in the title as a way to signal 
the international scope of the book’s analysis. I preferred 
other titles, particularly “More Equal, Less Equal: A New 
History of the 1970s,” which telegraphed more directly, 
I thought, the thrust of the book’s argument. The staff at 
the press demurred, citing other titles on their list with 
similar words and believing that such a title would be 
more difficult to promote. This is not (really) a complaint 
on my part: Princeton is an excellent press with which I am 
quite happy, and its staff is superb. But a publisher is out to 
sell books, appropriately enough, and in this case the title 
wound up being reshaped by concerns about marketing. I, 
however, ultimately signed off on the final title, so if it is 
misleading that is finally, alas, my responsibility.
The core issue is methodological. What am I trying 
to examine and explain, and how can I best do so? This 
is a problem across our diverse field, a problem that is 
reflected in its proliferating names: U.S. diplomatic history, 
U.S. foreign relations history, U.S. international history, 
transnational history, global history, the “U.S. and the 
world,” and the “U.S. in the world.” The last is the most 
awkward and seems increasingly the most commonly used. 
Such awkwardness is not, to my mind, a negative indicator, 
but rather an illustration of just how large and complicated 
our field has become. There is not yet a brief, felicitous term 
for the study of all the ways in which the most powerful 
modern nation has interacted with the rest of the world. 
My own intellectual commitments, from the beginning 
of my career, have included the intimate connection of 
U.S. domestic history to U.S. foreign relations—the inward 
swing of the “U.S. in the world” barroom door—and have 
increasingly come to include as well the connection between 
U.S. history and world history—part of the outward swing 
of that door.2 An emphasis on the place of the United States 
in world history requires that we think comparatively about 
the American past and how it shares with and differs from 
the pasts of other nations, regions, and processes. Most 
contemporary American political dialogue and far too 
much U.S. historical writing reflexively assume a degree of 
American exceptionalism or distinctiveness, regardless of 
the politics of the speaker or writer. Historians in our field, 
more than anyone else, must avoid that assumption until it 
is demonstrated evidentially.
Sargent accords The 1970s credit for including “a 
great deal of international history” as well as U.S. and 
world history. At the same time, he suggests that, subtitle 
notwithstanding, there is relatively less actual global 
history in the book, and that developments at a global level, 
such as economic integration or human rights activism, 
might be granted somewhat greater causal agency than I 
have allowed them in explaining events within the United 
States and other nations in this decade.3 This is a persuasive 
criticism, as the developing historiography increasingly 
reveals.4 
I am less persuaded by  Sargent’s questioning of the 
selection of cases in this decade. Certainly, focusing on the 
Soviet Union, with some attention to India, would yield 
different results than focusing on the United States, with 
some attention to China, but then the very subject would be 
different: Soviet/Russian history, rather than U.S. history, 
in international perspective. He raises the question of 
whether “a global model is derived from a mainly American 
experience, which is then held to cohere to the global 
model,” and suggests that “different cases might have” 
rendered “the American experience exceptional rather than 
representative.” The weight of the evidence, particularly 
in chapter 4, tilts sharply toward representation rather 
than exceptionalism. Indeed, as Sargent then goes on to 
suggest in his evenhanded fashion, the United States and 
the other “advanced economies” might best be seen as a 
vanguard for economic and political processes that would 
eventually sweep through most of the rest of the world. 
The Soviet story in this decade, as The 1970s does point 
out, proved to be far more the temporary exception to the 
larger pattern of increasing formal equality and shrinking 
economic equality. But I grant that the amount of attention 
paid in the book to developments in South Asia, like those 
in the Soviet Union, is less than ideal—regardless of those 
students who appreciate a less lengthy book. “Pattern,” for 
what it’s worth, seems a more useful term in this analysis 
than “model,” as the historical analysis in The 1970s shares 
little of the social scientific predilection for theoretical 
postulation.
Sargent raises one final issue: the problem of agency 
and accountability for this decade’s turn away from public 
sector expansion and toward “a new, rather harsher, kind 
of political economy.” Was this momentous shift a result 
of structural causes, along the lines of global economic 
integration, or did it stem primarily from the actions of 
individuals, “Leninists of the right”? As he suggests, how 
we answer this question as the historiography of this 
decade develops will reveal our sense of what else might 
have been, including whether the old order might have 
been extended “at least a few decades longer.” Chapter 5 
does trace the major dissenters, whom I see ultimately as 
gaining relatively meager political traction. While I have 
little personal fondness for the results of this new political 
economy, I do tend to see the structural causes, particularly 
of technological and financial innovation, as powerfully 
determinative—thus the slight note of resignation in the 
book, as Sargent observes. But structures must be manned, 
and real people devoted their lives to midwifing our 
new, market-driven order. The ideologues, intellectuals, 
politicians, media spokespersons, and organizational 
activists who herded the United States and most of the 
world into our current condition will face the judgment of 
future generations for the peculiar combination of wealth 
creation and maldistribution that they worked so hard to 
create. 
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